Making the institutions work better and more effectively together: Priorities for the New Commission. CEPS Commentary, 1 October 2014 by de Schoutheete, Philippe
  
Philippe de Schoutheete is former Permanent Representative of Belgium to the European Union 
and a former member of the CEPS Board of Directors. He currently serves as a member of the 
Board of Directors of Notre Europe. This CEPS Commentary is one of a special series aimed at 
contributing to the selection and review process of the new European Commission. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European 
affairs. The views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to 
any institution with which he is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2014 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
Making the institutions work better 
and more effectively together: 
Priorities for the New Commission 
Philippe de Schoutheete 
1 October 2014 
 
he priorities of the European Union in the field of institutions are circumscribed by the 
premise that any new treaty negotiation would, at present, be a fruitless exercise, 
probably dangerous and condemned to failure. In the present state of public opinion, 
nobody believes that a substantial European treaty could be unanimously ratified, 
irrespective of its merits. Preoccupations lie elsewhere, in growth and unemployment, and a 
treaty negotiation on institutions would seem provocative to many. Doubts about the future 
participation of the United Kingdom in the European enterprise merely increase the risks of 
any treaty negotiation.  
We have to accept that, as of now, institutional treaty change cannot be a priority. 
This does not exclude that treaty change may become possible and desirable at a later time, 
in a period of economic growth and greater self-confidence in public opinion. In a best-case 
hypothesis, such a window of opportunity might open towards the end of the present 
legislature. Meanwhile, attention must concentrate on adapting institutions to make them 
work better and work more effectively together. Therein lie the priorities. 
The European Council 
For many years the European Council has de facto been the central decision-making body in 
the Union. That position was consolidated by the Lisbon Treaty which recognised it as a 
formal institution of the Union and gave it a permanent president. The euro crisis enhanced 
its power because it called for important and urgent decisions, with serious consequences in 
member states and frequently outside the scope of treaty provisions. Such decisions could 
only be taken at the top level. 
The tenure of Herman Van Rompuy has established the role and functioning of the 
presidency of the European Council. He called meetings, largely determined the agenda and 
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controlled the preparatory work through various channels, including sherpas and numerous 
personal contacts. He prepared draft documents, negotiated compromises, chaired the 
meetings and oversaw the implementation of decisions taken. He had a role of external 
representation in a variety of international meetings held at the top level. And he did all this 
with a relative low level of visibility in the media, in order not to detract from the visibility 
sought by national leaders. 
It is reasonable to believe that Donald Tusk will seek to follow the same modus operandi, which 
has been generally considered as successful. He may be hampered, at first, by his linguistic 
abilities: difficult compromises are more difficult to secure when an interpreter is required. 
But his general approach to the task can be expected to be similar to that of Mr Van Rompuy. 
Some consideration should be given to relations with the Commission and the Parliament. 
Although the European Council is, by treaty, a Union institution, it is still largely considered 
in the Parliament and the Commission, and at various levels, as a dangerous 
intergovernmental intruder, foreign to the ‘Community method’ and destabilising the 
traditional ‘institutional triangle’. Conversely, quite a few members of the European Council 
look with suspicion at the increased power exercised by the Parliament and Commission. 
Such a level of mistrust is detrimental to the good working of the institutions. 
 Presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso have managed, through regular weekly 
contacts and personal dedication, to avoid the clashes that many experts predicted as 
inevitable. Indications are that Van Rompuy, in his tenure, actively supported the 
position and executive role of the Commission and its President. Nevertheless the 
role of the Commission in the European Council has been, deliberately it seems, more 
passive than in former years. It is clear that, over time, political initiative in European 
affairs has largely moved from the Commission to the European Council. But that 
should be an argument for the Commission to play a proactive role in the 
deliberations of the European Council. Jean-Claude Juncker, until recently a 
respected member of the European Council, will have that in mind. 
 The European Council is both a meeting of national leaders and an institution of the 
Union. In the first capacity, members are democratically accountable to their national 
electorate or parliament. In the second capacity, the treaty prescribes no 
accountability of the institution to the European Parliament. Nevertheless, the 
perceived democratic deficit in the functioning of the Union might argue for 
establishing closer and more regular relations between the European Council 
President and Parliament. Donald Tusk may want to consider this. 
The Commission 
Most observers agree that the Commission is too numerous to work effectively as a collegial 
institution. But any reduction in numbers would imply a treaty change and, importantly, a 
change of perception in most capitals. In the meanwhile, a number of practical modifications 
can be applied. 
 When a group is too numerous, some element of centralisation of the decision-
making process is needed. Many think tanks, including CEPS, have suggested 
organising ‘clusters’ in which several Commissioners deal with one main sector of 
activity, under the leadership of a Vice-President. President Juncker has introduced 
such a structure. Nobody believes that this system will be easy to implement, but a 
real effort should be made to ensure that it works.  
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 The tradition that each Commissioner must have a DG (and a director general!) 
answering to him or her, has swollen the administrative structure of the Commission, 
making it unmanageable. It is encouraging to note that Vice-Presidents will not have 
their own DG. But further streamlining the administrative structure of the 
Commission, as the Council Secretariat has done, would increase efficiency and 
transparency. 
 To be effective, a body the size of the Commission must be able to vote. Constant 
pursuit of consensus becomes paralysing. The treaty says that it may decide by simple 
majority. In fact, it has not voted in ten years, presumably because a simple majority 
seems problematic in view of the imbalance in membership. The Commission might 
decide, informally, that a proposal supported by a strong (two-thirds? three-quarters? 
four-fifths?) majority becomes binding on the College. 
 Proposals emerging from Commission services should always be submitted to a 
specific subsidiarity/proportionality control (including the de minimis principle), and 
to a detailed impact assessment, to be made by an independent service answering to 
the President or Vice-President heading a cluster. 
 It can be argued that the activity, visibility and influence of the Union, as such, on the 
international scene are more modest today than in the past. This is due more to lack 
of political will than institutional defects. Nevertheless, cooperation and mutual trust 
between the external service and Commission services could well be enhanced under 
the leadership of the Vice President-High Representative. 
 The Commission should be more present in national capitals. Important decisions 
should not simply be announced by a Commission spokesperson in Brussels. They 
should be explained, argued and defended in national capitals by members of the 
Commission, in political circles and before the media. Decisions would then seem less 
distant and less intrusive for public opinion. 
The Parliament 
Over time, Parliament has considerably increased its power and influence in European 
affairs: the process leading to the appointment of the President of the European Commission 
is a recent example. Parliament might reflect further on the exercise of its power and 
influence. 
 Legislation and control of the executive is the core business. Parliament should refrain 
from adopting declaratory resolutions on matters, however important, that go 
beyond a strict interpretation of Union competences. Such actions contribute to the 
widespread impression that European institutions constantly desire to extend their 
field of action. 
 Crucial decisions require democratic legitimacy and accountability both at the 
European and national level. The level of cooperation between the European 
Parliament and national parliaments should be increased. Up to now, practical efforts 
to that effect have not been convincing. Devising a new approach and imaginative 
solutions should be a priority. 
 Differentiation is now a fact of life in European affairs: the eurozone is the most 
obvious example, with eurozone summits and finance ministers meeting in the 
Eurogroup. The Commission, through its collegiality, is finding its way in this new 
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environment. Parliament should, for its part, reflect on whether and how it should 
adapt to this fact of life. The problem will not go away by ignoring it. 
The Council 
The Council has been overshadowed by the increased impact and visibility of the European 
Council. To regain visibility, it might increase transparency in its ways of working. It might 
consider further reducing the number of Council formations, which can be a source of 
confusion.  It might also reflect on the rotating presidency: is it still the optimal solution when 
the number of participants increases? Is it significant that the Eurogroup, which was free to 
choose because it is informal, opted for a permanent president? 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of a new legislature, the Union and its member states face institutional 
challenges to overcome the rising tide of euroscepticism, to accommodate increasing 
differentiation and to fix the British problem. Substantial treaty change is not a short-term 
option. But much can be done through practical modifications in the daily working of the 
institutions, and even more so by changing the spirit in which they operate. The underlying 
problem is lack of trust and confidence: trust between member states, between ins and outs, 
trust between national and Union institutions, trust between European institutions 
themselves, confidence of public opinion in the European process, confidence in political 
leadership and perhaps above all: self-confidence. As the polymath George Steiner once 
noted, “Europe is the continent of doubt”. Institutional priorities must be crafted with that 
situation in mind. With time, they may lead to a situation where substantial treaty change 
becomes possible. 
